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Discussant's Response to
An Auditing Perspective of the
Historical Development of Internal Control
Rodney J. Anderson
Clarkson, Gordon & C o .
By way of explanation relative to my remarks as discussant, please consider
that it was only yesterday that this paper reached my hands.
The paper may be said to consist of three elements:
1. A n overview of the historical development of auditing and internal
control,
2. T h e development of N o r t h American thinking on internal control
during the 20th century, and
3. Present thinking on internal control and internal auditing.
I w i l l organize my comments with respect to each of these three elements
and finally use the third as a jumping off point for a few other related thoughts
about control.
Overview of Historical Development
The first eight pages, indeed half the paper, deal with an overview of the
historical development of auditing and control. I found this interesting and
readable. I think it gives a good summary of the early beginnings. Perhaps it
could have gone a little more into the big jump from Charlemagne to the
Industrial Revolution—a period where, I think, the roots of many of our present
practices may be found. I w i l l refer again to this presently. T h e authors state
that control was the natural product of the profit motive. In the general sense of
human acquisitiveness ("Let's protect what we've got."—and what we're getting),
I agree. But i n the narrower sense, profit motive suggests commercial transactions.
In contrast, it was more commonly the wealth and the taxing power of the ruler
or government which was being protected i n those precursory days. A s an oversimplification, we might say that control i n auditing began w i t h public funds
(if one may use that euphemism for the ruler's hoard). A n d perhaps if the government take of the G N P continues at its present rate, we w i l l soon come full
circle. A n d future historians may look wistfully back at the 19th and 20th centuries as the age of private enterprise. However, that's not the subject for this
conference.
In any case, whether the very beginnings were private-commercial or rulerpublic is always a little difficult to tell from the literature. Certainly the examples
of Egypt, Persia and Rome are all public funds examples. O n the other hand, it
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may simpy be that such archeological records survive more easily. T h e references
to Sumerian transactions i n 3600 B . C . may indeed be commercial. Similarly, I
located an interested excerpt from one of the provisions of Hammurabi's code
from Babylon of 2200 B . C . Article 105 read: " I f an agent has forgotten and
has not taken a sealed memorandum of the money he has given to the merchant,
money that is not sealed for, he shall not put i n his accounts." T h i s w o u l d certainly seem to be commercial and would suggest the keeping of commercial
accounts and rudimentary elements of internal control.
A n d yet, one can find conflicting quotations. D r . Budge of the British
Museum was quoted as saying i n 1905: "There is no reason for thinking that
they (the Babylonians and the Syrians) managed their money affairs as we do.
There are many contract tablets k n o w n , and hundreds of records of commercial
transactions, but I know of none which could be considered as accounts i n the
modern sense of the w o r d . "
Be commerce as it may, the control and audit of government funds was surely
the predominant influence on early developments.
Mention is made of the division of duties among the Pharaoh's scribes—and
certainly division of duties is still an important element of internal control. Likewise, mention is made of the Persian surprise audits. Similarly, one might add,
the Greeks had a group of checking-clerks to check public officials' accounts.
T h e paper goes on to refer to the quaestors and the division of duties over the
Roman funds—and the source of the word audit as a hearing. Indeed, the division
of duties there saw legislative control over public revenues and expenses vested i n
the Senate, the power to order payments vested i n the censors, the farming of
tax collection rights to publicans by the censors i n the presence of the quaestors,
and the actual handling of receipts and payments by the quaestors. Certainly
this was an elaborate system of control.
The account then touches on the H o l y Roman Empire and Charlemagne—
and again this involves control and audit of government funds.
T h e n comes the gap—a jump to 1850 and the Industrial Revolution. But it is
during this gap that we see the main switch from control and audit of government alone, to control and audit of commerce—at least more as we k n o w it today.
T h e authors merely refer to the period of 1500 to 1850 as a birth of double
entry. I think this might have been explored further since double entry has
surely become one of the most important, though rudimentary, elements of i n ternal control. T h e first evidence of double entry seems to be i n Genoa i n 1340
and involved the stewards to the local authority (again government). F r o m
there it moved to Venice and became k n o w n as "method of Venice." Later it
moved to Florence. W h y this growth? O f course, it was due to the Italian maritime expansion. W e all remember that it was during this period that the Italian
merchant fleets spread all over the world—indeed, providing the source of the
name " A m e r i c a . " Ships coming from the East and from the N e w W o r l d were
financed principally as joint ventures, and pre-eminent among these were the
Venetian fleets. A n d so, i n 1494 i n Venice we have the first treatise on bookkeeping.
T h e treatise was by a mathematician, L u c a Paciolo (the spelling of his name
varies), whose book Summa de Arithmetica, Geometria, Proportioni et Proportionaiita included a section of 36 chapters on bookkeeping entitled " D e Computis
11

et Scripturis" ( O f Reckonings and W r i t i n g s ) . Paciolo recommended the method
of Venice. Three different accounting books were suggested. The first was a
"memorial" i n which one converted all the transactions to a consistent coinage
(showing that foreign exchange translation problems d i d not originate with the
F A S B ) . The. second was a journal to enter the converted amounts. The third
was a ledger for posting. Other writers added to the literature on accounting
and control i n Venice i n the following years.
Reference to England might have been mentioned before arriving at 1850—if
only because it leads to the birth of our modern profession. Some authorities
maintain that the English royal revenue was audited from the reign of W i l l i a m
the Conquerer. But generally the establishment of the English Exchequer is
assigned to the reign of Henry I ( i n 1100). Three independent records were
maintained and were checked to each other at the end of the year. Originally
they were audited by justices or barons (or their clerks) and later by official
auditors. In England during the feudal ages auditors w o u l d travel on circuit to
the manors and estates to check the accounting for disbursements and revenues.
Indeed, there was a tradition that the best ale i n the house was opened on such
occasions. Whether or not this contributed to clean opinions is no longer k n o w n ,
but the beverages were referred to as "audit ale."
Some writers have argued that the stable financial controls i n Elizabethan
England can be attributed, i n part, to auditors appointed by the C r o w n .
A n d that leads us to the 17th and 18th centuries and the growth of common
law corporations i n place of one-time joint ventures. Some of the bad speculative
practices of this period led to the South Sea Bubble i n 1720. D u r i n g this period,
therefore, the practice of accountancy developed further i n order to accommodate
the investigation of bankruptcies and other disasters.
Finally, we arrive at 1850—or perhaps more specifically 1844 with the passage
of the English Joint Stock Companies A c t . T h i s A c t provided for the appointment of auditors, though they were not independent. It generally ignored internal
control, despite the earlier urgings of Paciolo, and during this period auditing was
basically done on a 100% basis and was largely fraud-oriented.
By the early 1900's, the paper points out, auditors were still doing 100%
checking for clerical accuracy plus some examination of internal documentary
evidence. Testing was not used and little, if any, external evidence was examined.
Comparative Development of Thought on Internal Control in
England and North America in the 20th Century
T h e authors refer to the growth of the control concept from 1905 to 1933.
I think it might be interesting to compare the trends i n the United States, E n g land, and Canada during his period. D u r i n g the early 1900's, the statutory audits
i n Canada and the U . K . led to 100% checking. However, by 1930, the concept
of testing had begun, though little attention was being paid to internal control.
A slight amount of external evidence was being examined.
Meanwhile, i n the United States, audits were being performed not for statutory
purposes but for credit-granting purposes. This led to the idea of the balance
sheet audit as opposed to the clerical checking of Canada and the U . K . Subsequently, the idea of the balance sheet audit spread to Canada. A t the same time
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there was a move toward fairness of presentation. I n 1913 and 1917 we have the
advent of income taxes i n the United States and Canada with the result of
further emphasis being given to earnings. T h e n came the stock market crash of
1929 and following that more emphasis being placed on presentation, earnings,
and the income statement as opposed to the balance sheet. I n the 1930's with the
formation of the S E C , the United States became, for those of us i n Canada, the
dominant influence replacing the U . K .
In 1934 we have the beginning of the examination of external evidence i n any
quantity. I n 1939, the McKesson & Robbins case provided further impetus to
these developments (I thought the quote i n the paper on control was interesting
here as we usually think of this case as just being related to inventory observation).
T h e n i n 1941 generally accepted auditing standards were called for by the S E C
and i n 1948 promulgated by the A I C P A . I'm afraid i n Canada, we d i d not arrive
at a statement of generally accepted auditing standards until the 1960's at the
provincial level and not until 1975 at the Canadian Institute level.
I think it's interesting to note that with the gradual addition of external evidence to Canadian auditing practice (following English precedents) and w i t h the
gradual addition of checking of transactions to U . S . auditing ( i n order to justify
reliance on control) the two audit streams i n N o r t h America moved together.
Meanwhile, the U . K . also shifted from fraud detection to assurance of fair
presentation w i t h due reliance being placed on control. A l l these trends are
difficult to assess i n retrospect, as what historical writers now say and what
actually took place may often be two different things.
I thought it was an interesting idea to follow the changing views i n the
successive editions of Montgomery's Auditing.
I don't have any particular comment on this part. A lot of the material involves questions of semantics. Finally,
w i t h the 9th edition of Montgomery's Auditing i n 1975 we are up to "where
we are n o w . "
Present Thinking on Internal Control and Internal Auditing
T h e 9th Edition of Montgomery's Auditing presents a more elaborate analysis
of the components of internal control and I think this is useful. It has become
now not just an excuse for reducing tests but something that auditors have
decided they really must study i n a systematic manner. W i t h the A I C P A
Statement on A u d i t i n g Procedures N o . 54, we have the introduction of the concept of compliance tests and with that another dimension was added. I might
use these ideas as a jumping off point to discuss a few comments on internal
control classification.
Internal Control Classification
Several different methods of classifying controls exist, some of which are suggested i n the quotation from Montgomery's
Auditing.
A m o n g the possible
methods are:
1. By attest or non-attest significance.
2. By objective of the controls.
3. By accounting controls versus administrative controls.
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4. By preventive controls versus detective controls.
5. According to the general nature of the control technique.
W i t h respect to the attest versus non-attest significance, I think it is important
to emphasize that internal control is primarily a management tool and only secondarily of audit use. It follows, therefore, that some controls w i l l be important
for management but have no influence on the auditor's work and some controls
w i l l be as good as it is practical for management to make them but still not
sufficient to permit significant reliance by the auditor.
W i t h respect to classification of controls by objective one could talk about
safeguarding of assets, reliability of accounting records, the timely preparation
of reliable financial information, profitability and minimization of unnecessary
costs, the avoidance of unintentional exposure to risk, the prevention of detection
of errors and irregularities, the assurance that delegated responsibilities are being
properly discharged, and the discharge of statutory responsibilities by the management group. O f course, some of these objectives overlap. In any case, this matter
of classification is not particularly helpful i n analyzing control techniques since
the same technique can often serve several different objectives. F o r example,
perpetual inventory records independent of the storekeeper may help to (a) safeguard inventory, (b) ensure accurate inventory records, (c) detect inventory
shortages, and (d) prevent irregularities.
T h e split of accounting controls and administrative controls has been i n
professional literature for some time. Originally, accounting controls were said
to be related to safeguarding assets and influencing the reliability of financial
reporting while administrative controls were concerned w i t h promoting operational efficiency and adherence to prescribed management policies. However,
some administrative controls affect the reliability of financial reporting as well.
I confess I do not find it a very useful distinction. I rather think that the auditor
must look at any type of internal control which could have a bearing on his
expression of opinion on the financial statements.
T h e distinction between preventive controls and protective controls can be a
useful one. T h e idea was incorporated i n a recent Canadian Institute publication
"Computer Control Guidelines" though no doubt it has been discussed many
other places as well. Preventive controls prevent errors or reduce the chance of
error occurrence. Detective controls detect errors or increase the chance of their
detection. O f course, usually one must have both types of controls. Preventive
controls are perhaps what the 9th Edition of Montgomery's Auditing refers to as
disciplinary controls. One distinction between the two types of controls is their
auditability. T h e auditor can observe preventive controls relatively easily, though
it may be hard to evaluate their effectiveness. T h e operation of detective controls,
on the other hand, is very difficult to prove. That they are operating when an
error is caught is clear. But whether they were really operating i n between the
catching of successive errors is less clear. One can only assume that if another
error had occurred it would have been caught but one cannot really prove that
the detective control was functioning i n those cases.
Perhaps the most useful method of analyzing internal controls from the
auditor's point of view is by the general nature of the control technique. There
are many different ways i n which such an analysis can be made. One way would
be as follows.
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Organization
controls may be said to deal with honesty and competence
(hiring, supervision, training), segregation of functions (custodial versus reporting versus operating functions) and the overall plan of organization together
with the accounting/financial organizational plan. Systems development controls
deal with the development, approval and revision of systems—and must be considerably more formal i n the case of computer systems. Authorization and reporting controls deal with authorization, comparison, validity checking, budgets,
responsibility reporting, etc. Accounting systems controls deal w i t h initial recording (document design), general ledger and account organization and balancing routines. Additional safeguarding controls cover things such as restrictive
access, protection of records, periodic count and comparison, insurance, etc.
Management supervisory controls deal with the personal supervision by management, the monitoring of controls and the detecting of errors, and the internal
audit program. A n d finally, documentation controls cover manuals of policies
and procedures and, i n the case of computer systems, more elaborate documentation of systems and programs.
The Wagging Tail
O f the foregoing seven different types of controls, one can see that internal
audit is but a part—though admittedly a very important part. I believe it is
logical to view internal auditing as a part of internal control. It is the delegation
of the management monitoring function to a separate internal audit group. I
don't think one should view this as a tail wagging the dog. Indeed, i n large
systems the monitoring system may grow almost as complex as the system it
monitors. But this is merely analogous to E D P housekeeping controls using up
almost as much space as the actual w o r k i n g program they are controlling.
Conclusion
In summary, I thought the paper gave an interesting overview of the historical
development. A s i n all overviews, it is something that could also be expanded—
and indeed, might be of considerable interest i n a more expanded form. T h e
principal areas where some expansion might be of interest would be, as I have
suggested, feudal England, Renaissance Italy, and the coming of Companies Acts
to England, together with a comparison of the subsequent developments i n the
United States, England, and Canada.
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